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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Securitization in China 
Securitization, often used as an interchangeable term of structured finance
1
, 
originated in the United States in the 1970s
2
 and now has been developed as a 
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mature financing device internationally. Chinese government has been showing 
interest in securitization for a long time and the theories and practices of the 
securitization in the United States have provided valuable experiences for China to 
learn. The securitization practice in the mainland China had not been developed until 
mid-1990s, when Chinese academic scholars and financial lawyers had started to 
explore this field and made quite achievement since then. For example, in 1996-97, 
there had been three successful cases of securitization in China.
3
 One of them, 
Zhongyuan Company, issued 300 million U.S. dollars’ securities in the United States 
through private placement and these securities were backed by the company’s 
income from its flights to and from North America.
4
 Zhuhai Highway also 
successfully issued 200 million U.S. dollars’ bonds in the United States backed by 
the registration fee of transportation vehicles and the toll fee of the highway.
5
 These 
cases, however, all involved overseas issuing, and strictly speaking, they were not 
local Chinese securitization cases. 
From September 2000, the state-owned banks in China started to be involved in 
asset securitizations. However, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter “PRC” or “China”) was very cautious until 2005 when it finally 
approved the State Development Bank and the Bank of Construction to conduct the 
so-called “test” securitization of credit assets and home loan mortgages.6 Later on, 
asset-backed securitization (ABS) also started to emerge in China. For example, a 
trust and investment company in Shenzhen launched a cash-trust
7
 plan in 2006 by 
pooling public investors’ funds. The trust raised RMB 80 million Yuan’s funds8 and 
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  1  Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Structured Finance, in ELSEVIER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 1 (2011). 
 2  Id., at 3. 
 3  Lihua Duan, A Research on Pricing Based on Mortgage-Backed Securitization (2004) 
(unpublished M.S. thesis, University of International Business and Economics) (on file with 
author). 
 4  Jun Liang, Case Study on the Zhongyuan’s Securitization, RESEARCH ON INVESTMENT BANKS, 
http://web.cenet.org.cn/web/ibmasters/index.php3?file=detail.php3&nowdir=&id=35618&d
etail=1 (last visited on Sept. 5, 2013). 
 5  Analysis on the Securitization Cases in China, FINANCIAL WORLD, 
http://www.jrj.com.cn/NewsRead/Detail.asp?NewsID=149543 (last visited on Sept. 5, 2013). 
 6  Chunming Zhou, A New Thought on Asset Securitization: Banks Ready for 
Securitization , FINANCES WEEKLY OF THE SOHU FINANCES (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://business.sohu.com/22/66/article203576622.shtml. 
 7  If the trust property is money other than the other types of property, the trust is 
called a “cash trust” which is subject to stricter rules in China. 
 8  The exchange rate of U.S. Dollars to RMB Yuan on Sept. 6, 2013 is 1: 6.1728 according 
to the People’s Bank of China. The same amount of RMB Yuan was worth less U.S. Dollars 
back in 2006 owing to the appreciation of the RMB. 6 Yuan Central Parity Rate at 6.1728 
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was backed by the expected 3-year net income of a hotel.
9
 It is fair to say that the 
localization of asset securitization in China has kept the same pace as the other Asian 
countries during this period. 
Since 1999, securitization has become the focus of many important research 
projects conducted by the PBC and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), and it has also been regarded as an important chapter in the plan of Chinese 
government to convert Shanghai into a financial center. Shanghai government has 
submitted various reports to the PBC asking for approval for pioneering home loan 
mortgage securitization.
10
 In late March 2001, when the then chief of the PBC, Mr. 
Xianglong DAI, explained the recent financial reform tasks, he especially pointed 
that mortgage-backed securitization would be encouraged in order to promote the 
construction of residential houses. In April 2001, the PBC Shanghai Branch 
submitted a proposal to Shanghai government in which non-Mortgage backed 
securitization was listed as one of the most important tasks that Shanghai 
government needed to implement.
11
 In the same year, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) of China passed the Trust Law, which formally introduced the trust 
system originated in the common law countries into China and thus it is regarded as 
a milestone because it has removed certain legal obstacles for asset securitization.
 
People believe that trusts are the most common vehicle used in securitization. 
Local securitization cases quickly emerged in China, especially in the real estate 
area. Generally, the trust companies pooled money from public investors through 
issuing trust certificates, and then use the funds thus raised as loans to the real estate 
developers and expect the value of the real estate project would be greatly increased 
after the project being completed, which had been true for quite a long time. The 
trusts established this way are “cash trusts” subject to strict rules and regulations as 
further introduced below. 
B. The Context of the Case 
The State Council of the PRC unleashed a RMB 4 trillion Yuan’s economic 
stimulus package in November 2008
12
 in responding to the world economic crisis. 
As a result, the real estate industry in China had risen abruptly and the house prices 
had soared in the latter half of 2009, which in turn stimulated the development of 
real estate financing. However, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(“CBRC”) had issued a series of rules and regulations since 2005 to regulate this 
                                                                                                                                         
Against U.S. Dollar Fell 32 Basis Points (Sept. 6, 2013) http://www.instant-news.us/news-
5358234.html. 
 9  China’s Market for Securitization Products Developed Steadily, ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS 
(Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sei.gov.cn/printpage.asp?ArticleID=84342. 
 10  Chuanquan LI, et al, Preface of Translators part 4, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (CHINESE TRANSLATION), Tsinghua University Press (2003), 
available at: http://www.sinobook.com.cn/b2c/scrp/bookdetail.cfm?iBookNo=100004 (last 
visited on Jan. 13, 2015).  
 11  Id. 
 12  Chen Wei, The New Economic Stimulus Package: Upcoming or Awaiting, ECONOMIC 
REFERENCE DAILY (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/yw/2009-
04/15/content_153737.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
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area, among others, the real estate developers must, in order to get financing, have at 
least class-II qualification, and their real estate project must have four certificates: 
the certificate of land-use right
13
, the certificate of land planning permit, the 
certificate of project planning permit, and the certificate of project construction 
permit.
14
 These strict rules made it difficult for the real estate developers to get loans 
from banks or other financial institutions. Therefore, the developers turned to the 
trust investment companies for funding. 
Chinese Trust Law was promulgated in 2001, largely based on the common law 
of trusts. However, Chinese people are not familiar with the trust system since it is 
not a traditional system in China; therefore, there have been few private trusts, if 
any. Instead, people establish trusts almost always for commercial purposes, and 
mostly, securitization. These trusts are called “营业信托” in Chinese, which could 
be literally translated as “trusts for profit15.” The trustees must be the trust 
companies authorized to engage in trust businesses.  
In the beginning, the trust property of most of these trusts was money, and the 
regulator names it as “cash trust” to distinguish it from the “non-cash trust” where 
the trust property is other forms of property. Comparatively speaking, the “cash 
trusts,” especially the trusts with multiple settlors (investors), are more heavily 
regulated in China because they are easy to be regarded as devices for “illegal 
money-polling (or illegal fund-raising)” which is a crime under Chinese Criminal 
Law
16
. The most concern is that for a cash trust, the trustee may solicit public funds 
                                                          
  13  According to Chinese law, all lands are owned by the State and private individuals or 
institutions may only have the right to use the land. 
  14  The trust companies were also required to conduct self-compliance examinations 
regarding these rules. See Notice on Trust Companies’ Risk Warnings on Real Estate Trusts 
Businesses, CRBC, No.343, (2010), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=335491. 
  15  A “trust for profit” is different from a business trust or commercial trust in the 
common law countries in that it refers to a trust where the trustee is a trust and investment 
company authorized by government to do trust business for a profit.  
  16  Article 192 of Chinese Criminal Law prescribes: 
Those who illegally raise funds through frauds for purpose of 
illegal possession and if the amount is comparative bigger, shall 
receive no more than five years’ imprisonment or detention, plus 
a fine of no less than RMB 20,000 Yuan but no more than RMB 
200,000 Yuan; if the amount is huge or if the circumstance was 
severe, an imprisonment of no less than five years but no more 
than ten years will be imposed, plus a fine of no less than RMB 
50,000 Yuan but no more than RMB 500,000 Yuan; if the amount 
is extremely huge or if the circumstance was extremely severe, an 
imprisonment of no less than ten years or life imprisonment shall 
be imposed plus a fine of no less than RMB 50,000 Yuan but no 
more than RMB 500,000 Yuan, or forfeiture of personal property. 
 
See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 192, NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 
(2011), http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-01/14/content_24405327_12.htm 
2014] WHO OWNS THE MIRAGE? 5 
 
by promising an attractive investment return while using the funds for personal 
benefits so as to harm the investors’ interests. The PBC required each such cash trust 
with multiple settlors have no more than 200 settlors with each settlor investing no 
less than RMB 50,000 Yuan.
17
 The CBRC subsequently revised the regulations in 
2007 and 2009, removing the “200 investors” cap by requiring the number of 
individual investors being no more than 50 and the number of institutional investors 
unlimited.
18
 However, it requires the investors (settlors) of such cash trusts must be 
“qualified” investors (settlors).19 These requirements have made it difficult for trust 
companies to pool public funds through establishing cash trusts.  
Since 2005, Chinese government decided to halt the irrational development of 
the real estate industry by imposing restrictions on bank loans through requiring the 
real estate developers to have certain qualification, and that the project must have 
obtained the aforementioned “four certificates.” Both banks and trust companies 
have been affected and subject to the same rules. However, since many real estate 
developers need the money before they can get the “four certificates,” the trust 
companies and the real estate developers have explored the possibility of 
establishing “non-cash trusts” to fund the projects to avoid the strict rules governing 
cash trusts.  
With both the restrictions on directly granting loans to real estate companies and 
the restrictions on establishing cash trusts, the trust companies had been seeking 
alternatives to engage in real estate investment. They actually might help the real 
estate developers to establish a trust to securitize the real estate project they own; 
however, for the reasons analyzed below, most of them decided to get financing only 
through using the “proceeds accruing from” their real estate project. These trusts are 
given a fancy name “XXX资产收益财产权信托”, and literally translated as “Trusts 
on the Right to Proceeds to be Accrued from XXX Project Assets.” They may also 
be called “Right to Proceeds Trusts” or simply “Right Trusts” in the paper. From its 
name, such a trust is apparently not a cash trust, and the trust property seems to be 
the right to proceeds only, instead of the underlying project assets. Doesn’t it sound 
like a mirage? And, is it true that the right to proceeds is the trust property in such 
trusts?  
With these questions unanswered, such real estate trusts have become very 
popular in China since 2009 and there had been no disputes until 2013 when A 
Company sued B Company based on such a device in an intermediate court of 
Shanghai. Statistics show that the beneficial interests in such trusts in China had 
reached RMB 800 billion Yuan by the end of 2012, and among them, 310 billion had 
                                                                                                                                         
(promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1997, amended several times with 
the most recent revision made in Feb. 2011). 
  17  See Provisional Measures on Management of Cash-Trusts by Trust Investment 
Companies, PBC DIRECTIVE, No. 7, art. 6, (2002), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rhwg/021601f.htm 
(issued by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and effective from July 18, 2002). 
 18  See Measures on Management of Cash-Trusts with Multiple Settlors by Trust 
Investment Companies, CBRC DIRECTIVE, No. 3, art. 5, (2007), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/200909155AD71D59AFD82FB5F
FA27E225216B800 (issued in Jan. 2007, and revised in Feb. 2009). 
 19  See id. Article 6. 
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been due in the year of 2013.
20
 One of the reasons why real estate trusts are so 
popular in China is because of the high demand from the real estate industry and the 
high return to both the real estate industry and the trust companies.  
However, the real estate bubble is very easy to burst. When it does, who owns 
the money, who owns the un-finished building, who owns the mirage (the right to 
proceeds), and who suffers the loss? With disputes arising, these first-impression 
questions are presented before the Chinese courts. This paper will examine the first 
Chinese case seeking to answer the above questions and try to identify the most legal 
obstacles against the development of commercial trusts and securitization in China. 
C. The Case 
B Company is a real estate developer in China. Being driven by the high profits 
in the real estate industry, it launched an ambitious real estate project “K Project” 
adjacent to Shanghai in 2009, planning to build luxurious villas and office buildings, 
and expecting high return after they were completed and sold based on the then real 
estate market. However, it needed finance of about RMB 215 million Yuan. Since 
the government had imposed stricter restrictions on banks or other financial 
institutions (including trust companies) to directly grant loans to real estate 
developers since July 2009, B Company could not get loans owing to its lack of the 
required qualification, and owing to the fact that the K project had not yet received 
the “four certificates.”  
A Company is a trust investment company authorized by the CBRC to do trust 
business in China. As a public company listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange since 
1994, it has been actively engaged in the real estate trust business to finance real 
estate companies, especially after the strict rules have been implemented on the real 
estate loans. 
On this background, A Company and B Company fit in quickly with each other, 
and signed a Financing and Accounting Consultation Service Contract (“Financing 
Service Contract”) in August 2009, under which A Company undertook to help with 
B Company’s financing. One month later, A and B signed a Trust Contract on the 
Right to Proceeds to be accrued from K Project (“Trust Contract”) under which B 
Company is the settlor and A Company is the trustee.  
According to this Trust Contract, the trustee would divide the trust property into 
62,700 units (with each unit representing RMB 10,000 Yuan’s value) and issue the 
same amount of trust certificates to beneficiaries. The beneficiaries include two 
classes: the senior beneficiaries and general beneficiary (also called “subordinated 
beneficiary). B Company is the sole general beneficiary, and the senior beneficiaries 
are the investors identified by A Company upon creation of the Trust. Senior 
beneficiaries will purchase no less than 21,500 but no more than 23,000 units of the 
trust certificates, and the rest would be held by the general beneficiary, B Company. 
Through this structure, B Company would get the loan of no less than RMB 215 
million Yuan and thus would achieve its goal of finance. According to the Trust 
Contract, the underlying property is K Project under construction, and the land-use 
rights in the land under the K Project which are lawfully owned by B Company. The 
                                                          
 20  The Case Arising from Kunshan Chungao’s Default Causing More Debates, Judicial 
Organ Postponing the Decision-Making, NO. 1 TRUST NET (March 27, 2013), 
http://www.dyxtw.com/news/2013032711173.html. 
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trust property is said to be the right to receive the proceeds to be accrued from the 
underlying property, and the property obtained through managing, utilizing, selling, 
or disposing of the underlying property. The term of the Trust Contract was three 
years. 
In order to ensure the Trust Contract to be properly performed by B Company, A 
Company signed a few other contracts with B Company, including an Agreement on 
Fund Supervision, a Loan Contract, a Mortgage Agreement, and a Framework 
Agreement on Financing (“Framework Agreement”), and problems arose from these 
contracts, especially the Loan Contract. 
The Loan Contract provided that A Company would grant loans of no more than 
RMB 230 million Yuan to B Company for purpose of developing the K Project. The 
term of the loan would be three years with an annual interest rate of 10%. To secure 
this loan, B Company mortgaged the underlying property as defined in the Trust 
Contract with A Company, and has made the mortgage agreement properly 
registered according to law.  
In both the Trust Contract and the Loan Contract, the parties agree that B 
Company may sell the underlying property and transfer the proceeds to the Trust 
Account held by the trustee according to a schedule. They further imposed an 
obligation on B Company to keep certain minimum amount of funds in the Trust 
Account at different points. For example, before the end of 2009, the minimum 
amount of funds would be RMB 20.7 million Yuan, and upon one year after the 
Trust was created, the minimum amount would be 10% of the total amount of the 
loan. 
After these contracts have been executed, A Company issued the trust certificates 
to investors and B Company successfully received the funds as needed for its project 
construction. However, owing to Chinese government’s macro-control of the real 
estate market, as well as for other reasons, the sale of the K Project has not been as 
good as expected. As a matter of fact, B Company could not keep the minimum 
amount of funds with the Trust Account as early as September 2010 when the Trust 
had been established for only one year. Upon September 23, 2012, the Trust term 
expired and the loan was due, but B Company had never been able to honor its 
commitment under either of the contracts.  
A Company then sued B Company on the ground that the latter breached the 
Loan Contract, requesting the court to order B Company to repay the principal and 
interests of the loan plus various default penalties, compound interests, and 
attorney’s fee. Alternatively, A Company requested foreclosure of the collateral to 
satisfy the debt. Meanwhile, the Trust was automatically extended until September 
24, 2013, and the extended deadline for disposing of the collateral will be on 
September 30, 2013. The main issues before the court included, among others: (1) 
whether the cause of action of this case is one based on the Loan Contract or one 
based on the Trust Contract; (2) whether the defendant breached the contract, and if 
so, what would be its liability; (3) whether the plaintiff may enforce its mortgagee’s 
rights based on the Mortgage Agreement affiliated to the Loan Contract. 
Since there are RMB 800 billion Yuan’s funds involved in similar transactions in 
China, the court’s decision on this case would no doubt be very significant because it 
may determine the rights and obligations of all the other trust companies and real 
estate companies, as well as the public investors. Because of the complexity of the 
legal relationships in this case, also because the potential impact of this case on the 
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whole real estate trust industry, it took the first instance court about three months to 
make the final decision. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Since the cause of action raised by A Company was breach of the Loan Contract, 
while B Company alleged that the relationship between the parties should be based 
on the Trust Contract instead, the main dispute of this case is whether B Company’s 
securitization transaction was done through establishing a trust, or through 
structuring a secured loan. In other words, whether the Trust Contract (and the Trust 
created hereunder) and the Loan Contract (and the relevant documents) are effective 
respectively, and simultaneously. This case is regarded as the first case ever 
involving and testing Chinese trust law in a real sense.  
This part will analyze this case based on Chinese law on trusts and securitization 
and from a comparative approach. 
A. The Effectiveness of the Trust 
1. Title Transfer of the Trust Property Not Required 
In China, the trust is a system transplanted from the common law. As a wealth 
management scheme which separates ownership rights and equitable interests, the 
common law trusts feature the “dual ownership” concept under which the trustee 
owns the legal title of the trust property and the beneficiaries own its equitable 
interests. 
21
 However, this concept has an inherent conflict with the “one property 
one right (Eine Sine Sache, Ein Recht)” principle followed by the civil law system; 
thus many civil law countries, when transplanting the trust system, have modified 
the dual ownership requirement.
22
 China promulgated the Trust Law in April 2001 
which modified the common law of trusts in a Chinese way. Article 2 of the Trust 
Law provides
23
: 
 
For purposes of this Law, trust refers to that the settler, based on 
his faith in trustee, entrusts (委托给) his property rights to the 
trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of the settler 
and in the name of the trustee, administer or dispose of such 
property in the interest of a beneficiary or for any intended 
purposes. (Emphasis added.) 
                                                          
  21  See George T. Bogert, Trusts 1 (6th ed. West Publ'g Co. 1987); See also Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 3 (2003). 
 22  Some civil law scholars call the legal title as “ownership in name” and the equitable 
interest “ownership in substance” or “right to benefit.” See Jialin Fang, Theories and Practice 
of Trust Law, CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & L. PRESS, 70-71 (2004), cited in LINGYUN GAO, TRUST LAW – A 
MISUNDERSTOOD SYSTEM 28 (Fudan Univ. Press 2010).  
 23  [Trust Law of People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. of the 
Ninth Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Apr. 28, 2001), art. 2, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-
02/12/content_21907980.htm (2011).  [hereafter referred to as the “Trust Law”]  Unless 
otherwise indicated, all articles of Chinese law and the articles of the various contracts 
involved in the case at issue cited in this article are translated by the author.   
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It shows that the Chinese Trust Law has generally adopted the features of the 
common law of trusts, but avoided the “dual ownership” issue by allowing the trust 
property to be “entrust[ed] (委托给)” instead of “transfer[red]” to the trustee.24  One 
of the purposes of the common law of trusts is to separate the ownership rights and 
the beneficial interests of the trust property; however, the Chinese Trust Law neither 
clearly recognizes nor explicitly denies this division of ownership. Without 
distinguishing trust relationship from agency relationship, the trust system and the 
trust law in China have a latent defect which needs to be addressed and rectified. 
However, before it is done, the trusts created through “entrustment” or other ways 
under which the title to the trust property is not transferred should be determined as 
valid according to the current Trust Law. 
The Trust Contract involved in this case did not explicitly mention whether the 
title to the trust property would be transferred to the trustee, but stipulated in article 
6.3.1 that “the total proceeds to be generated by the underlying real property will be 
part of the trust property under this Trust and are not part of the settlor’s assets,” 
which may have two possible interpretations: first, the parties’ intent was that the 
trust property should be independent from the other assets owned by the settlor, and 
second, the trust property had actually been transferred to the trustee. No matter 
which one is true, it shall not affect the validity of the trust, because even if the 
former prevails, it would at least prove that the parties had mutual assent to the 
creation of the trust. 
2. Creation Requirements Generally Satisfied 
Under Chinese Trust Law, the elements for creation of a trust
25
 include the 
following: 
a.  There must be a lawful purpose.
 26 The purpose of the Trust at issue was “to 
realize the liquidity of the underlying assets” which is not unlawful. 
b.  There must be a settlor who intends to create a trust using his lawfully-
owned property.
 27
 B Company is qualified here. 
                                                          
 24  Chinese scholars have different understandings on article 2 of the Trust Law. Some 
scholars believe that “entrust[ing] to (委托给)” should mean “entrust[ing] and giv[ing] to,” 
which actually means that the property ownership must be transferred so that there is no 
difference from the common law concept of trusts. However, since the Draft of the Trust Law 
used the term “transfer[ring] to (转移给),” which was only be changed into “entrust[ing] to 
（委托给）” after the legislature’s final review, other scholars argue that “entrust[ing] to （
委托给）” clearly indicates an agency relationship and does not involve title transfer. See 
Baoyu He, Research on Trust Law Principles, CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & L. PRESS, 10-11 (2005), cited 
in LINGYUN GAO, TRUST LAW – A MISUNDERSTOOD SYSTEM 278 (Fudan Univ. Press 2010). 
  25  The elements listed here are those required for non-charitable trusts. For charitable 
trusts, there are special requirements and will not be discussed here because they are 
irrelevant to this paper. 
 26  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 6. 
 27  Id. at art. 7. See also Id. at art. 19. (Article 7 prescribes that “. . . such property must 
be the property lawfully owned by the settlor.” Article 19 provides that “the settlor shall be a 
natural person, a legal person, or an organization established in accordance with law, that 
has full capability for civil conduct.). 
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c.  There must be a trustee who has full civil capacity and is willing to serve as 
the trustee.
28
 A Company is qualified here. 
d.  There must be a beneficiary (or beneficiaries) who is (are) specified or can 
be specified.
29
 Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the Trust Contract provides that the 
beneficiaries of the Trust include no more than 199 senior beneficiaries and the 
subordinated beneficiary (i.e., the settlor), and that the senior beneficiaries would be 
identified by A Company. If sufficient number of senior beneficiaries could not be 
identified, the Trust would not be created at all. Further, since article 43 of the Trust 
Law allows the settlor to be the beneficiary, the subordinated beneficiary in this case 
is also legitimate. Therefore, both the senior and subordinated beneficiaries are 
specified upon creation of the Trust.  
e.  There must be trust property which is definite and specified or can be 
specified.
30
 It does not require the trust property be specified upon creation of the 
trust, and can be inferred that as long as the trust property can be specified (based on 
a certain standard), the trust will be valid. According to the stipulations stated in 
article 3 of the Trust Contract, “the initial trust property is the property right of the 
Settlor in the proceeds to be accrued from the underlying assets (3.1),” “the trust 
property under this Trust also includes the property received by the Trustee for 
managing, utilizing, and in any other ways disposing of the underlying assets (3.2),” 
and that “the proceeds in any form accruing from the underlying assets will become 
part of the underlying assets, and the proceeds will automatically become part of the 
trust property under this Trust (3.4).” Here the “proceeds” does not exclude the 
original value of the underlying assets and there is no distinction of trust income 
from the trust corpus. Carefully reading the above three articles together, one may 
conclude that all property and property rights in the underlying assets and the 
proceeds thereof are trust property under the Trust Contract, which satisfy the 
requirement for definiteness (to be specifiable).
31
 
f.  There must be a writing to evidence the trust.
32
 Chinese Trust Law does not 
recognize declaration of trusts; therefore, a trust could only be created in writing. 
This Trust Contract was in writing. 
Again, transfer of title is not one of the requirements to create a trust in China. 
Through the above analysis, the Trust involved in this case generally complies with 
                                                          
 28  Id. at art. 24. 
 29  Id. at art. 11.  Article 11 of the Trust Law lists the situations where a trust may be held 
invalid, and the fifth item is that “the beneficiary or the scope of the beneficiaries cannot be 
specified.”  It may be concluded that the beneficiaries must be specified or specifiable.  
  30  Id. at art. 7.  Article 7 of the Trust Law provides that “to create a trust, there must be 
specified trust property, and such property must be lawfully-owned by the settlor.” “The 
property referred to in this Law includes lawful property rights.” Among the list provided in 
Article 11 that may invalidate the trust, item 2 is “the trust property cannot be specified.” Id. 
at art. 11.  Reading these articles together, it can be concluded that the trust property must 
be specified or specifiable. 
 31  However, neither A Company nor B Company would admit it. Traditionally people are 
very reluctant to admit title transfer in a context other than sale. 
 32  Article 8 of the Trust Law provides that “to create a trust there must be a writing.”  
See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 8. 
2014] WHO OWNS THE MIRAGE? 11 
 
the elements for creation required by the Chinese Trust Law. The Trust here is one 
created by B Company as the settlor, based upon trust in A Company, as the trustee, 
using “the lawful right to proceeds to be accrued from the underlying assets and the 
other property obtained through managing, utilizing, or disposing of the underlying 
assets” as trust property. The purpose of the trust was “to realize the liquidity of the 
underlying assets” through “issuing trust certificates to investors.”33 
3. Registration Requirement Arguably Met 
Although all of the six elements as listed above have been satisfied, it is still 
possible to argue that the Trust is invalid because article 10 of the Chinese Trust Law 
has not been satisfied. Article 10 prescribes: 
 
To create a trust, where the relevant laws or administrative 
regulations require the trust property be registered, the trust shall 
be so registered. 
Where the trust has not been registered in accordance with the 
above paragraph, a ratification registration shall be made; 
otherwise, the trust shall have no effect.
34
 
 
This provision shows that registration generally is not a necessary element for 
creation of a trust in China, unless the trust property has such a special nature that 
another law or regulation requires it be registered. In this situation, the trust could be 
invalid if without registration. However, this provision does not specify whether “the 
relevant laws or administrative regulations” refer to the laws and regulations that are 
specifically about trust registration, or the laws and regulations that require 
registration of property rights; therefore it may invoke multiple interpretations.  
At present, trust registration is the most vulnerable point of the Chinese trust 
system because there is neither a central registration system nor local registration 
systems for trusts to register. The current registration systems for real property and 
personal property do not intend to include trust registration at all. The only trust 
registration institution – Shanghai Trust Registration Center (STRC) – which is 
located in Pudong area, Shanghai City, is a platform for companies only to 
voluntarily register their trusts, and its evidential value remains to be tested by 
judicial proceedings. Based on the available information, A Company had actually 
registered the Trust at issue with the STRC. While the law is ambiguous regarding 
trust registration and the mandatory registration institution is unclear, it is reasonable 
to recognize that the registration with the STRC is effective, and the challenge of the 
validity of the Trust at issue solely because it was not registered is not sound. 
4. Conclusion: The Trust Validly Created 
Considering that the Trust in this case generally complies with the requirements 
for creation of trusts and for registration under the Chinese Trust Law, and that A 
Company had formally notified the senior and subordinated beneficiaries on Sept. 
24, 2009 of the creation of this Trust, conclusion may be made that this Trust has 
been validly created, and the Trust Contract is lawful and effective. 
                                                          
 33  See article 2 of the Trust Contract (on file with author) involved in this case.  
 34  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 10. 
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The trial court held that the Trust Contract was valid but the reasoning was quite 
simple and only contained two points: First, the court reasoned that although the 
plaintiff sued on breach of the Loan Contract, the defendant defended on the ground 
of the Trust Contract while the plaintiff did not deny the existence of the latter; 
Second, the Trust Contract reflected both parties’ true intention, and did not violate 
any prohibitive clauses of law and regulations.
35
 The court did not even analyze any 
of the above elements. 
There is actually a policy consideration to support this conclusion. Since 2009, 
there have been huge amount of similar trust products issued to the capital market 
involving a large amount of real estate companies, trust companies, and investors. 
Upon creation of these trusts, people only saw benefits but ignored the risks. The 
trust companies provided large amount of funds to the real estate companies 
expecting unreasonably high return; meanwhile, they tried to avoid the legal 
obstacles through designing so called “right trusts.” In order to further protect their 
own interests, they signed separate loan contracts and subordinated security contracts 
(to be discussed below). If everything went well, the trust companies would rely on 
the trust contracts; however, when the real estate market went down, these trust 
companies would claim against the real estate companies based on the loan 
contracts. After carefully reviewing these trust contracts, it is easy to find that most 
of the articles are in favor of the trustees. The main reason is that the parties’ 
negotiation powers were in great disparity and the real estate companies which badly 
needed funds were apparently at the weaker position. It is undeniable that the real 
estate companies themselves had the fault in the first place in that they rushed to the 
real estate development projects before they obtained the required qualification or 
certificates in order to obtain unreasonably high benefits. It is thus reasonable that 
when crisis occurs, the real estate companies and the trust companies shall 
collectively assume the first risks, and the investors should only assume the 
secondary risks. Determining such trust contracts invalid may cause moral hazards. 
B. The Nature of the Trust 
1. A Commercial Trust 
The traditional trusts in the common law countries are private trusts; however, 
with the economic development, commercial trusts have increasingly become an 
active participant in the capital market. Just because of the unique feature of the 
commercial trusts in the financial area, many civil law countries have transplanted 
the trust system. It can be illustrated from the Chinese Trust Law which allows for 
“trusts for profits (营业信托)” that Chinese law clearly recognizes the legal status of 
commercial trusts. 
One of the main differences between private trusts and commercial trusts in the 
common law countries is whether the settlor receives consideration for the transfer 
of the property to the trustee.
36
 If no consideration is received, i.e., if the transfer of 
the trust property is gratuitous, the trust created is a private trust, also called 
                                                          
 35  See Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, CIVIL JUDGMENT, (2012) Hu Er Zhong 
Min Liu (Shang) Chu Zi No.7 at 29-30 (on file with author). 
 36  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the 
Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559 (2003). 
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gratuitous trust. If the settlor receives consideration for transferring the property to 
the trustee, then the trust is a commercial trust. Another important distinction 
between private trusts and commercial trusts is whether the settlor retains residual 
interests in the trust property. The settlor in a commercial trust generally retains the 
residual interests in the trust assets after the business transactions have been 
completed, while the settlor of a private trust may or may not retain such an 
interest.
37
 Therefore, commercial trusts have become an important vehicle of 
structured finance. It may be used in securitization transactions as well as in other 
types of finance transactions with a view to diversifying loan risks.  
The Chinese Trust Law encourages the development of trust system; however, 
there has been no specific rules implementing the Trust Law after its promulgation. 
Therefore, there is no rule specifying the commercial trusts, their status, or function. 
Nevertheless, in practice, most of the trust companies have all been conducting 
structured finance transactions, and mostly based on the commercial trusts of the 
common law model. To this end, even if Chinese Trust Law has not clearly provided 
that the title to the trust property must be transferred, the settlor in a commercial trust 
must transfer the ownership right in the trust property to the trustee, because they 
have received consideration for it. 
The Trust in this case is clearly a commercial trust. It is not possible that B 
Company, the settlor, gave away the trust property to A Company, the trustee, for 
free. The purpose of the trust as stated in the Trust Contract is that “the settlor wants 
to realize liquidity of the underlying assets (art. 2),” and there is a stipulation that the 
trustee shall “give to the settlor, upon successful creation and effectiveness of the 
Trust, in a lump sum” the funds invested by the investors (art. 4.6.1), which fully 
illustrates that the purpose of the settlor’s transfer of the trust property to the trust 
was to receive consideration. Meanwhile, the settlor, as the subordinated beneficiary, 
retains residual interest in the trust assets (art. 4.5). Thus, the Trust at issue here 
satisfies the requirements for a commercial trust. 
2. A Commercial Trust in Structured Finance 
In a structured finance transaction, the company that needs financing, as the 
initiator, will pool together the assets it owns that may generate stable future cash 
flow, and then divide them into smaller units to issue to the investors in the capital 
market. Doing so, they could diversify the risks associated with the capital, and 
meanwhile, may obtain finance at a lower cost. Since there are more restrictions and 
more risks on the initiators to issue securities by themselves, they would normally 
establish a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for the structured finance transaction. The 
initiator may package and sell the assets to the SPV, who in turn pays to the initiator 
the consideration for purchasing these assets. The common form of the SPV is 
commercial trusts. The SPV does not have sufficient money to pay for the trust 
property, so it will raise funds through borrowing or turning to the capital market 
through issuing asset-backed securities. These securities may take the form of 
commercial paper or debt-like trust certificates. The investors purchase these 
securities because they have confidence in the value of the assets supporting the 
                                                          
 37  Id. 
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securities. In other words, the credibility of these securities is much higher than that 
of the secured debts of the same company.
38 
 
Actually, the trusts used in structured finance are not different from the 
traditional private trusts. In both situations the settlor will transfer his lawfully-
owned assets to the trustee for him to manage. However, the trustee in a structured 
finance will need to pay consideration to the settlor. Normally the trustee would 
divide the trust property and its proceeds into smaller units and issue trust 
certificates to the investors. The purchase price thus received by the trustee will be 
paid to the settlor, and the investors who purchase the trust certificates become the 
beneficiaries of the trust. Afterwards, the trustee will manage the trust property, and 
use any proceeds accruing from the trust property to repay the investors. 
When the trust assets in a structured finance transaction are money, the trustee 
may personally manage the trust property; nevertheless, when the trust property is 
other forms of tangible property, the trustee normally will hire some specialized 
institutions, i.e., servicer, to manage the trust assets. The reason is because the 
trustees are mostly financial institutions who do not have experience or expertise to 
specifically manage these properties. Sometimes, because of the special feature of 
the trust assets, the trustee may entrust the original owner of the trust property, i.e., 
the settlor, to be the servicer, because the settlor as the initiator of the original assets 
has experiences and expertise in managing the assets. Furthermore, from the settlor’s 
point of view, they are also willing to provide routine service (which actually is the 
business that they have been doing) for the structured finance transaction and charge 
a fee. The financing cost may be further lowered.
39
 
Apparently, the Trust at issue is exactly such a commercial trust used in a 
structured finance transaction. The settlor is B Company, who delivered its assets to 
the trustee, A Company, and the latter divided the assets into smaller units (627,000) 
to issue part of them to public investors (senior beneficiaries) and the rest to the 
subordinated beneficiaries (B Company). Afterward, A Company paid the funds 
received from the senior beneficiaries as consideration to B Company. Thus, the 
financing purpose of B Company had been realized, and the financing was 
completed. The trust property is managed by A Company as trustee.  
Since the trust property in this case would be the relevant real estate and their 
future proceeds, the management of which is not the routine business of A 
Company, article 6.2 of the Trust Contract provides that “[d]uring the term of this 
Contract, the underlying assets shall be kept in its original form, and the settlor 
commits that they will well keep the underlying assets, and will be responsible for 
managing, operating, and selling the underlying assets,” which shows that the trustee 
A Company entrusted B Company as servicer to manage, construct, and sell the trust 
property – the underlying real estate, and that B Company should transfer the sales 
proceeds to the trust account to repay the principal and expected interests to the 
senior beneficiaries. This provision may also implicitly support the argument that B 
Company only had the right to “keep” instead of “own” the trust property. Based on 
this understanding, when reviewing article 3 of the Trust Contract which provides 
                                                          
 38  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. 
& FIN. 133 (1994). 
 39  Regarding the functions of a servicer, see generally, Ian H. Giddy, ASSET SECURITIZATION 
IN ASIA, available at: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/ABS/absasia.pdf (last visited on Jan. 
13, 2015). 
2014] WHO OWNS THE MIRAGE? 15 
 
“[a]ll of the proceeds in whatever form accruing from the underlying assets held by 
the settlor will become part of the underlying assets, and the proceeds will 
automatically become part of the trust property under this Trust (art. 3.4),” it is 
reasonable to conclude that B Company held the trust property as a “servicer” under 
entrustment of A Company instead of owning the assets as an owner. 
It is interesting, however, that there is no stipulation in the Trust Contract about 
any remuneration that B Company will receive for its managing the trust property; 
instead, article 6.2 of the Trust Contract provides that “[a]ny expenses arising from 
keeping the underlying assets should be borne by the settlor,” which means that all 
expenses that incurs to the servicer – B Company would be borne by itself. It is 
certainly fine if this stipulation was assented to by the parties after fully 
understanding its meaning, but it is very possible that the parties had not even 
thought about B Company’s role as the “servicer.” 
3. Co-Existence of Two Trusts 
It is to be noted that there may have two trusts in a structured finance transaction, 
especially if the SPV issues trust certificates to public investors. The first trust is to 
be considered from the view of the initiator who needs financing: it delivers the 
property to the trustee who will in turn manage and operate the property and 
distribute any proceeds to the beneficiaries. In this trust, the trust property is the non-
cash property or property rights. There is still a second trust, i.e., a cash trust. In a 
cash trust, the public investors are settlors, and they deliver the money they lawfully 
own to the trustee who will in turn manage the money and invest it in a specific 
project, and distribute any proceeds to the investors (as beneficiaries). To this end, 
the beneficiaries of the first non-cash trust are the settlors of the second cash trust, 
and the cash trust is a self-benefited trust which means the settlors establish this trust 
for their own benefits. In a same financing transaction, these two trusts may exist 
simultaneously while the trustee could be the same, and the settlor(s) and 
beneficiaries are different. Thus, when analyzing the trust relationship, one must be 
able to clarify the interaction of these two trusts, and should also consider whether it 
is lawful to use the first non-cash trust to avoid the regulation and restrictions 
imposed on the cash trust (as Chinese government does). Since this issue is not the 
focus of this case, there will be no further discussion about it in this paper. 
4. A Property Trust or A Right Trust 
Article 7 of the Chinese Trust Law provides: 
 
To create a trust, there must be specified trust property which must 
be lawfully-owned by the settlor. 
 The “property” herein includes the lawful interests in the 
property.
40
 
 
When the Chinese trust companies initially designed trusts, they preferred cash 
trusts, and non-cash trusts were very rare. However, in order to avoid the stringent 
legal regulations on cash trusts, also because recently the Chinese government 
started macro-regulation and control on the real estate sector, some attorneys and 
                                                          
 40  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 7. 
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trust companies have collectively created a new type of trusts mainly focusing on the 
right to proceeds accruing from the real estate as the parties to this case did. The 
name of the Trust in this case is exactly such a Right Trust. In order to determine 
whether such trusts are lawful, we need firstly distinguish a few confusing concepts. 
a. Proceeds, Right to Proceeds, and Beneficial Rights 
It is necessary to distinguish proceeds, right to proceeds, and beneficial rights, 
especially because they are pronounced quite similar and sometimes seem to be 
tongue-twister in Chinese, and thus are very easy to be mis-spelled. 
Proceeds (收益) in Chinese means the earnings and income accrued from certain 
underlying assets, such as rental income and the increased value obtained from sale 
of real estate (the money received from the sale deducting its original value). Right 
to proceeds (收益权) refers to a right to receive the proceeds out of certain 
underlying assets, such as the right to receive rental income and the right to receive 
the increased value obtained from sale of real estate. The exercise of this right should 
not change the ownership status of the underlying assets. 
In the trust law area, the beneficial right (受益权) refers to the right of the 
beneficiaries against the trust property, which is called “equitable interests” at 
common law, and “substantive ownership” or “beneficial right” under civil law. 41 
Therefore, the beneficial right is similar to a kind of quasi-ownership right. 
Trust property includes trust corpus (principal) and its income; and the beneficial 
right owned by the beneficiaries of the trust may be against the trust corpus and/or 
income. 
b. Trust Corpus and Trust Income 
According to the common law of trusts, the property that the settlor transfers to 
the trust is trust corpus (or principal). Since the purpose of a commercial trust is to 
preserve and increase the value of the trust corpus through the trustee’s management, 
the increased value of the trust corpus could be part of the corpus and/or part of the 
income depending on different situations. Both the trust corpus and income 
constitute the whole part of the trust property. Therefore, the trust beneficiaries may 
be beneficiaries entitled to trust corpus and those entitled to trust income, or those 
entitled to both.  
In a word, the proceeds in the context of trusts are the cash and non-cash 
property that the trustee received from the trust corpus as present profit, including a 
part of the income accrued from the sale, exchange, or settlement of the trust corpus 
after deducting its original value. Trust income means “money or property that a 
fiduciary receives as current return from a principal asset. The term includes a 
portion of receipts from a sale, exchange, or liquidation of a principal asset, ...”42 
Trust corpus is “the property held in trust for distribution to a remainder beneficiary 
when the trust terminates.”43 If the trust corpus has been converted into a new type 
of property owing to change of its form, then the new type of property will be the 
trust corpus.  
                                                          
 41  See Jialin Fang, Theories and Practice of Trust Law, CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & L. PRESS 70-71 
(2004). 
 42  See Unif. Principal & Income Act §102(4) (1997). 
 43  Id. at §102(10). 
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The rights of the beneficiary entitling to receive income and the beneficiary 
entitling to receive the trust corpus are different, because they would obtain different 
interests from different part of the trust property. During the period of managing the 
trust, the trustee may receive money or other property from various sources for 
different reasons. They must be able to judge whether these “proceeds” should be 
part of the trust income or part of the trust corpus. This determination will directly 
affect the distribution to different types of beneficiaries. Therefore, the concept of 
distinction of “trust income” and “trust corpus” is very important at common law. 
The trustee, of course, may also distribute to a certain beneficiary from both the trust 
corpus and the trust income based on the settlor’s intent. 
The Chinese Trust Law, however, does not distinguish trust income from trust 
corpus; instead, it provides that any income and proceeds accruing from the trust 
property accepted by the trustee will become part of the “trust property.” 44 Since 
there has been no private trusts in China in a real sense, and the existing “trusts for 
profit” provided in Chinese Trust Law mostly have a simple distribution model 
which are basically self-benefited and the beneficiaries will almost receive all of the 
trust benefits, it seems to be unnecessary to consider the distinction between the 
distribution of the trust corpus and the trust income in China. Nonetheless, with the 
commercial trusts becoming more and more complex, the distribution model for 
different classes of beneficiaries will also be developed accordingly. There is no 
question that the Chinese Trust Law will need to address this issue in the near future. 
c. Proceeds of Trust Property v. Right Trusts 
The right to proceeds (收益权) in the trusts based on right to proceeds to be 
accrued from specific property (资产收益财产权信托, “Right Trusts”) emerging in 
China is a totally different concept from the proceeds of trust property (信托财产收
益) discussed above. The proceeds of trust property refers to the income and 
proceeds accruing from the original trust property (i.e., trust corpus) after the trust is 
created, which may be distributed to various beneficiaries according to the 
stipulation contained in the trust instrument. On the other hand, the right to proceeds 
in a Right Trust reflects the concept of the trust corpus, which means that the 
property delivered to the trustee by the settlor is not a tangible property, but a right to 
receive the proceeds which are to be accrued from the underlying assets. Therefore, 
the underlying assets are not trust corpus, and only the right to receive the proceeds 
against the underlying assets is the trust corpus. If the underlying assets do not exist, 
the right to proceeds will become a mirage. 
A very important issue thus involved is whether the right to proceeds can satisfy 
the requirement of the Trust Law that the trust property must be specified or at least 
could be specified. In order to answer this question, one should consider the value of 
the underlying assets (including whether there exists a market which may form its 
value) and the performance of the settlor in managing the underlying assets. 
However, the analysis below will reach a conclusion that the Right Trusts in China 
are actually trusts based on the underlying assets and its all proceeds, therefore the 
trust property is specified and definite, and thus can satisfy the requirements of the 
Trust Law. To this end, this paper will not further explore whether the right to 
                                                          
 44  See Trust Law, supra note 24, at Art.14 (“the property received by the trustee for 
managing, utilizing, disposing, or handling in other means also belong to the trust property.”) 
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proceeds may satisfy the Trust Law’s requirements, and will research it further in the 
future. 
Why is whether the right to proceeds may be trust corpus irrelevant to this case is 
because the trust property of the so-called “Right Trust” does not only include the 
right to proceeds, but also include the underlying assets. The Trust involved in this 
case is a good example. Such a Right Trust generally defines “right to proceeds” as 
“the beneficiary’s right to the cash proceeds accrued from the advance sale, sale, or 
in any other forms utilizing and disposing of the underlying assets (deducting the 
taxes and expenses for the advance sale or sale).”45 Compared with the definition of 
“income” contained in the Uniform Principal and Income Act 1997, “income” 
includes a portion of proceeds accrued from the trust corpus.
 46
 Here the “portion” 
apparently does not mean the total value thus received from the sale. 
Hence, the Right Trusts in China are actually trusts based on property or assets, 
not trusts based on the right to proceeds only, because the so-called “specific assets” 
will directly become trust property based on the trust contract. In addition, according 
to Chinese Trust Law, any proceeds accrued from managing or disposing of the trust 
property will automatically become part of the trust property which may be used to 
distribute to the beneficiaries. Therefore, the term “Trusts based on Right to 
Proceeds to be accrued from Specific Assets (特定资产收益权财产信托)” is only 
playing the words to confuse people, and such trusts by nature are still trusts based 
on tangible property. Accordingly, the determination of the definiteness of the trust 
property in a Right Trust is not relevant here because its trust property is definite and 
specified.  
To conclude, although the Trust involved in this case was named as a “Right 
Trust,” since the underlying assets are also part of the trust property, after piercing 
its veil, the nature of this Trust is actually a non-cash property trust, or an asset trust. 
Almost all of the other Right Trusts existing in China are in the same category. 
There is another question however involved in this case, which is the transfer of 
the trust property. Although Chinese Trust Law does not require a transfer of title of 
the trust property, if the settlor receives consideration for creating such a trust, like a 
trust used in securitization, things are different. In this case, the Trust Contract 
stipulated that “the proceeds in any form accrued from the underlying assets held by 
the settlor will become part of the underlying assets, and the proceeds will 
automatically become part of the trust property under this Trust (art. 3.4),” and that 
“during the term of this Trust, the underlying assets involved in this Trust shall be 
kept as it was originally kept, and the settlor commits that they will well keep the 
underlying assets, and will be responsible for managing, operating, and selling the 
underlying assets (art. 6.2).” (The “underlying assets” mentioned in all above 
situations are the real estate based on which B Company established the Trust.) 
These articles fully support the argument that the right of B Company against the 
trust property is only a right to “keep” and not a right to own. 
In summary, the Trust involved in this case is a commercial trust used in the 
structured finance transaction initiated by B Company and the trust property includes 
the underlying assets of the K Project and their future proceeds. It is misleading to 
                                                          
 45  See e.g., Art. 1, Item 10 of the Trust Contract in this case interpreting “the right to 
proceeds of the underlying assets.” 
 46  See Uniform Principal and Income Act, supra note 43, at §102(4). 
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state that only the right to proceeds accrued from the above underlying assets is the 
trust property. However, the first instance court did not make any comment on this 
point in its decision. 
C. The Legal Relationship in the Trust 
The above analysis is based on the fundamental principles of the trust law as well 
as the review of the Trust Contract at issue; this section will analyze the legal 
relationship among the parties to the Trust. 
The Trust involved in this case is a commercial trust, the purpose of which is to 
conduct structured finance in order to “realize the liquidity of the underlying assets 
(art. 2).” As stated above, in a commercial trust used in securitization or other types 
of structured finance, the purpose of the settlor to create the trust is to resolve the 
financing problem; therefore, they must ask for consideration for the transfer of the 
trust property. Even if Chinese Law does not so require, the ownership right in the 
trust property should be transferred in a structured finance transaction because the 
settlor will receive consideration therefor.  
There are, of course, exceptions. For instance, in a trust used to finance real 
estate development, if the real estate developer as the settlor receives a consideration 
from the trustee the amount of which approximately matches the value of the real 
estate (the trust property) (less taxes and service fee, etc.), the consideration is one 
for transferring the title of the real estate. However, if there is a huge difference 
between the amount of consideration received and the value of the real estate, it is 
not the consideration for transferring the title of the real estate. Generally, the 
purpose of the real estate companies to establish trusts is always to get maximum 
amount of funds based on the value of the real estate, it is unlikely that they would 
only like to get financing based on the increased value of the real estate they 
originally own. 
In this case, the consideration A Company paid to B Company included RMB 
215 million Yuan raised from the senior beneficiaries and the residual interest of the 
trust represented by the subordinated trust certificate held by B Company. In return 
for this consideration, it is reasonable to argue that B Company has actually 
transferred the title to the trust property to A Company. 
If the title transfer is recognized, the question comes back to the registration issue 
stated in part I. The trust property in this case is real estate, the transfer of which 
must be registered so as to constitute public notice in order for the Trust to be 
effective according to Chinese law. While the law requires registration but in reality 
there is no institution responsible for such registration, how to complete registration 
has become a greater problem. Under this circumstance, one may argue that the trust, 
as well as the transfer of the trust property should be recognized as long as the 
parties have done their best to post public notice of the creation of the trust (e.g., the 
parties registered with Shanghai Trust Registration Center in this case). 
It is praiseworthy that the court acknowledged the public notice of this Trust. The 
court held that public notice had been posted for both the creation of the Trust and 
the raising of the funds from the investors and that both had been completed. 
Therefore, the court determined that the Trust was a trust for profit (commercial 
trust), and that the nature of the dispute of the case was based on the Trust.
47
 
                                                          
 47  Supra note 36, at 31. 
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1. Trust Relationship and Agency Relationship 
Based on the above analysis, the legal relationships between the parties of this 
case include a trust relationship and an agency relationship. The trust relationship is 
as follows: 
B Company is the settlor, who transferred the trust property – the right to use the 
land and the ownership right over the K Project under construction above the land – 
to A Company as trustee to manage. For this transfer, A Company paid to B 
Company as consideration RMB 215 million Yuan from the fund it received from 
the public investors who purchased the trust certificates it issued, plus the residual 
interest in the trust property. On the one hand, A Company believed that the K 
Project if sold in the future would generate proceeds far more than 627 million RMB 
Yuan considering the up roaring real estate market in China; on the other hand, the 
public investors also believed in A Company’s advertisement believing that their 
investment in this project would never suffer loss. Furthermore, since B Company 
owned beneficiary right as a subordinated beneficiary, and would not participate in 
distribution before the senior (public) beneficiaries had been paid in full, it actually 
served as over-collateralization for the other beneficiaries and thus built up more 
confidence in the public investors. It is exactly one kind of credit enhancement that 
every securitization transaction would adopt. 
In summary, in this Trust, B Company is the settlor, A Company is the trustee, 
the public investors are senior beneficiaries, and B Company itself is the 
subordinated beneficiary. The trust property is the K real estate project under 
construction and the right to use the land thereunder, as well as any future proceeds 
to be accrued from the project. The purpose of the trust is to get financing for B 
Company to construct the K Project. 
After the Trust was created, according to the trust theory, the settlor – B 
Company received the consideration for transfer of the trust property and should not 
have legal title over the trust property, but only have the right to the residual interests 
as a subordinated beneficiary. The trust property was owned by the trustee ever 
since, and all risks associated with the trust property had also been transferred to the 
trustee accordingly. From then on, the trustee should be responsible for managing 
and operating the K Project. 
However, similarly to the other international structured finance transactions, A 
Company as a financial institution did not have the qualification or expertise to 
manage and operate a real estate project; therefore, A Company as the trustee, also 
as the legal owner of the trust property, needed to hire a servicer to help manage and 
operate (including sell for profits) the trust property. Normally it needed to sign a 
servicing contract with the servicer and pay the service fee accordingly. This practice 
does not violate the Chinese Trust Law. As a matter of fact, article 30 of the Chinese 
Trust Law provides that: 
 
The trustee shall handle the trust matters personally, except that the 
trustee may entrust another person to handle the trust matters if the 
trust instrument provides otherwise, or if the situation indicates 
that there is no other alternatives. 
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Where the trustee lawfully entrusts another person to handle the 
trust matters, the trustee shall be liable for the activities conducted 
by the latter.
48
 
 
Many times, the trustee hires the original owner of the trust property as the 
servicer. Likewise, A Company hired B Company as the servicer to “continue” the 
operation and management of the trust property. Article 6.1 of the Trust Contract 
provides that: 
 
The fund invested by the senior beneficiaries of this Trust shall be 
delivered to the settlor by the trustee in accordance with the trust 
instrument, and the trustee shall supervise the settlor’s use of the 
fund to pay the unpaid expenses for K Project and to adjust its 
financial structure. 
 
This article fully reflects the fact that B Company served as the servicer, and thus 
there established a new type of relationship between A Company and B Company: 
an agency relationship, under which A Company was the principal and B Company 
was the agent. According to the General Provisions of Chinese Civil Law
49
 and 
Chinese Trust Law, the activities conducted by the agent will bind the principal, and 
the principal will be liable for the activities conducted by the agent. 
Thus, there are both a trust relationship and an agency relationship between the 
parties to this case. 
2. Who assumes the risk of loss? 
The Trust Contract includes a paragraph on its cover page as a standard waiver 
made by A Company, which is also the general standard waiver in the whole trust 
and investment industry in China: 
 
The trustee, when managing the trust property, shall strictly 
observe its duty, fulfilling the obligations of being honesty, 
trustworthy, diligence, and effectiveness. The risks arising from 
the trustee’s management of the trust property based on the 
stipulations of the trust contract shall be assumed by the trust 
property. Any loss of the trust property arising from the trustee’s 
inappropriate handling of the trust matters in violation of the trust 
contract shall be compensated from the trustee’s own assets; if the 
trustee’s own assets are not sufficient to pay the loss, the settlor 
shall assume the loss by him/herself. (Emphasis original.) 
 
The last sentence is very interesting because it does not even consider the 
situation that the party who might suffer loss may well be the beneficiary instead of 
the settlor (as what happened in this case) if the trustee’s own assets would not be 
enough to pay the loss. An obvious reason is that currently most trusts in China are 
                                                          
 48  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 30. 
 49  The General Provisions of Chinese Civil Law (“Civil Law”) was promulgated by the NPC 
in 1986 and effective since Jan. 1, 1987. It is still valid today. 
2014] WHO OWNS THE MIRAGE? 22 
 
self-benefited trusts created by the settlor who is also the sole beneficiary. Of course, 
if the senior beneficiaries are all paid in full, then only the subordinated beneficiary 
(i.e., the beneficiary with a right against the residual trust property) will suffer loss, 
and most of the subordinated beneficiaries are the settlors. Thus, the Chinese trust 
companies have not considered all possible situations when they are designing trust 
instruments.  
In this case, should A Company, as the trustee, assume the risk of loss of the trust 
property (e.g., if the underlying real estate cannot be constructed or sold as 
expected)? It will depend on whether the ownership right over the trust property had 
been transferred from B Company to A Company. Based on the analysis through the 
paper, in the context of commercial trusts, if the purpose of establishing a trust is to 
conduct structured finance, upon receipt of the consideration (financing fund) by the 
settlor, the title of the trust property should be owned by the trustee, and accordingly, 
all future proceeds or risks associated with the trust property will also be transferred 
to the trustee. If the trustee worries that the risk is too big to bear, it should be careful 
and prudent when negotiating with the settlor about the amount of consideration. 
Some people may think that the Trust involved in this case is a trust based on 
“right to proceeds to be accrued from the underlying assets” and that the risk that the 
real property may not be duly sold as expected should not be associated with the 
trust property at all. This argument contributes to the ridiculous “mirage” theory, and 
is a misreading of the Trust Contract on the other hand. As analyzed above, the trust 
property (i.e., the property from which the beneficiaries will receive distribution) 
here not only includes the increased value of the underlying assets, but also includes 
the proceeds accruing from the disposing of the underlying assets themselves. 
Therefore, although such a trust is called a “Right Trust,” the veil should be pierced 
so that the nature of such a trust will be seen as a trust based on the underlying 
assets. The proceeds of the underlying assets will also become part of the trust 
property though. Accordingly, for a property trust, once the property is transferred, 
all proceeds and risks associated herewith should be automatically transferred 
altogether according to the principle of fairness of the Chinese civil law. This is the 
way how the interests of investors (beneficiaries) could be protected. 
Hence, the following conclusion is made: 
In this case, B Company transferred the underlying assets (K Project and the 
right to use the land under the Project) it owned to A Company, who paid the former 
consideration for this transfer through issuing trust certificates to public investors. A 
Company was expected to repay the public investors from the proceeds accruing 
from managing and operating (including constructing, managing, and selling, etc.) 
the underlying assets. All costs that A Company may incur during managing the trust 
may be paid out of the trust property according to the trust instrument. For 
convenience of operation and management, A Company entrusted B Company as the 
servicer to manage the trust property and requested the latter to deposit any proceeds 
accrued from the underlying assets to a trust account held by A Company. If the 
management and sale of the trust property went well, A Company would be able to 
repay the beneficiaries timely and in full, and the residual property would belong to 
the subordinated beneficiary, B Company. Upon distribution of trust benefit, A 
Company should firstly pay from the proceeds of the trust property; if such proceeds 
would not be sufficient to pay the senior beneficiaries, A Company might dispose of 
the trust corpus and use the proceeds to pay the senior beneficiaries. If the proceeds 
thus received still could not fully repay the senior beneficiaries, the beneficiaries 
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would bear the risk of loss, unless the loss occurred owing to the trustee’s breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
3. Protection of Beneficiaries’ Interests upon Breach 
As stated above, the trustee – A Company – might dispose of the trust corpus if 
the proceeds thereof would not be enough to pay the senior beneficiaries. A 
subsequent question is how A Company should dispose of the trust corpus. Since 
there is neither a central nor local registration system in China under which trusts 
may be registered, and that A Company had registered the Trust at issue here with 
STRC, it is reasonable to recognize that the trustee had the right over the trust corpus 
under the said Trust. Although such a right is weaker when compared with the 
security interests provided by law, after considering the inherent imperfection of the 
Chinese Trust Law, such a right should be recognized as long as no third party 
creditors are involved, or no conflicts existed against the rights of a third party 
creditor. If so, A Company would have the right to dispose of the trust corpus in 
order to repay the beneficiaries for their trust certificates. 
However, if the trustee simply disposes of the trust corpus (here the underlying 
real estate) at an unreasonable low price and thus harms the value of the trust corpus, 
the trustee would breach the fiduciary duty. The beneficiaries (including the 
subordinated beneficiary) would have the right against the trustee for compensation.
 
50
 
The fiduciary duty is the most fundamental duty under trust law because the trust 
originally emerged simply because the settlor had confidence and faith in the trustee 
so that he transferred his own property to the trustee for management on behalf of 
the beneficiaries. Both the English term “trust” and its Chinese counterpart “信托” 
reflect such a confidence and faith. Thus the trustee owes a very high standard duty 
of fiduciary not only to the settlor, but also to the beneficiaries. Such a fiduciary 
relationship is different from a normal business relationship. 
The trustee who owes fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries must be honest, fair, and 
solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries when managing the trust property. The 
fiduciary duty of the trustee includes duty of care and duty of loyalty.
 51
 In addition, 
the trustee should also treat the beneficiaries who hold different interests (such as 
senior and subordinated beneficiaries) impartially, and may not seek maximization 
of one class of beneficiaries’ interests at the expense of the other class of 
beneficiaries’ interests, so that the rights of all beneficiaries will be equally 
protected. If the trustee inappropriately disposes of the trust corpus and results in 
unreasonable loss suffered by the beneficiaries or one class of beneficiaries, then the 
trustee breaches its fiduciary duty. 
In the announcement of creation of the Trust made by A Company to both the 
senior and subordinated beneficiaries in this case, there is such a sentence: 
                                                          
 50  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 25 (“the trustee shall observe the 
stipulations of the trust instrument and shall handle the trust matters for the best 
interests of the beneficiaries. The trustee when managing the trust property must 
strictly observe its duty and fulfill its obligations of being honesty, trustworthy, 
diligent, and effectiveness.”) 
 51  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 27. 
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This Company, as the trustee of the Trust, will prudently handle 
the various matters of the Trust with a view to maximizing the 
benefits of the beneficiaries and strictly in accordance with the 
trust instrument. 
 
This is exactly the embodiment of the trustee’s fiduciary duty. It can be inferred 
that A Company as the trustee fully understood its fiduciary duty. 
In order to prevent breach of fiduciary duty, the trustee may, after fully 
examining the situations of the trust property make a reasonable business judgment. 
Meanwhile, since in this case public investors would be involved, the trustee might 
adopt measures such as convening the beneficiaries’ meeting to find a solution to 
maximize the beneficiaries’ benefits. For instance, upon consent of all of the 
beneficiaries, the term of the trust may be extended; the trust property may also be 
disposed of by various ways. From the background of this case, the main reason for 
the insufficiency of the trust income was because the government’s policy changes, 
the going down of the real estate market, and the fact that upon establishment of the 
Trust, the parties to the Trust had an unreasonable expectation on the proceeds of the 
trust property. It is unreasonable to blame only and any one of the parties; therefore, 
each party shall assume corresponding liabilities.  
If the ultimate result of the consultation would be that the trustee must sell the 
trust corpus through auction at a price lower than expected, then the proceeds of the 
auction should be firstly used to pay the management expenses of the Trust 
(including the expenses and reasonable remunerations of the trustee and the 
servicer), and then used to pay the senior beneficiaries. The residual interests, if any, 
would belong to the subordinated beneficiary. If the proceeds of the auction would 
not be sufficient to repay the senior beneficiaries, then the latter would assume the 
loss; at the same time, the subordinated beneficiary would not get any benefit from 
the Trust. The Trust is terminated. 
However, the problem in this case is that A Company did not have the right to 
dispose of the trust corpus under any of the current law in China. As already 
explained, the Trust Law does not require title transfer, while the real estate law 
requires the title transfer be registered with the real estate bureau to evidence the 
ownership right in the real property. It was not possible for the parties to register any 
mortgage agreement secondary to the Trust Contract with the real estate bureau in 
China. Although A Company has actually registered the Trust with STRC, its 
probative value is uncertain and remains to be tested by the judicial proceedings. 
This is the crucial reason why A Company did not feel its rights sufficiently 
protected; therefore, it sought protection from signing a Loan Contract with B 
Company. It is disappointing that the court did not respond to this situation, and 
neither clearly announced the effectiveness of the registration with the STRC, nor 
resolved the title transfer issue. Therefore, the question regarding how to properly 
deal with the trust property in order to better protect the interests of the beneficiaries 
is still unanswered by the court. 
D. The Loan Contract 
In addition to the Trust Contract, the contracts involved in this case also include a 
Loan Contract, a Framework Agreement on Financing, and other relevant contracts. 
This section will focus on the Loan Contract. 
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In a normal business transaction, a trust company may provide loans to a real 
estate company, as long as no prohibitive provisions of any law or regulations are to 
be violated. However, it is unnecessary for us to specifically analyze whether in this 
case it was lawful for A Company to extend loans to B Company, because simply 
based on the Loan Contract as well as its performance, we conclude that this Loan 
Contract is without basis. The reason is because A Company had not provided any 
loan to B Company. Regarding the RMB 215 million Yuan that A Company 
transferred to B Company, it was stated as the “money received in exchange for the 
senior beneficiary’s interests,” and thus the 215 million was based on the Trust 
Contract, and the transfer of which was the prerequisite for the creation of the Trust. 
It was not the loan extended by A Company to B Company. If this sum of money 
were recognized as a loan, the following absurd arguments would have been made 
naturally: 
a.  One must recognize that after A Company had received the underlying 
assets as the trust property from B Company for free, it had again mortgaged the 
same underlying assets to itself as a condition to extend a loan to B Company. The 
disorder in logic is apparent; or 
b.  One must recognize that A Company had established a fake non-cash Trust 
without obtaining the underlying assets from B Company, the purpose of which was 
to extend a loan to B Company by establishing a cash trust but to avoid stricter 
regulations on cash trusts. It was illegal. 
As a matter of fact, A Company gave RMB 215 million Yuan and the residual 
interests to B Company in consideration of the transfer of the trust property. 
According to article 4.6.1 of the Trust Contract, “the investors shall pay to the trustee 
within the soliciting period of the Trust and the payment will be paid to the settlor in 
a lump sum after the Trust is created and becomes effective.” Apparently this was 
the consideration for creating the Trust and not a loan. If it were a loan, A Company 
might have committed illegal fund-raising (which is a crime in China), because if it 
did not own any rights in the underlying real estate, how could it issue trust 
certificates backed by the underlying real estate to the public investors? On the other 
hand, even if B Company still owned the title to the underlying real estate and only 
entrusted A Company to issue the trust certificates, the sale’s proceeds should also 
belong to B Company based on the agency relationship, how could it be regarded as 
the loan granted by A Company? Considering also article 6.3.1 of the Trust 
Contract: “All proceeds accrued from the underlying assets are part of the trust 
property of this Trust and do not belong to the settlor’s assets.” It shows that B 
Company had no longer owned the ownership rights over the underlying assets and 
their proceeds. One could not imagine a more confusing logic than this: B Company 
gratuitously transferred the underlying real estate to A Company, and then managed 
and operated the underlying real estate at its own expense (art. 6.2) for A Company 
without charging any service fee; and ultimately all of the proceeds would belong to 
A Company, and the money received by B Company was surprisingly a loan! 
Article 3.2(6) of the Loan Contract provides that “the successful establishment of 
the Trust would be the pre-requisite for the issuing of the loan;” chapter 5 of the 
Loan Contract further provides that “the Loan under this Contract would be used for 
the borrower to develop and construct the K Project and adjust its financial structure. 
The borrower shall not use the loan for any other purpose.” It further proves that the 
relationship between the parties in this case was and could only be trust relationship, 
unless B Company had received another RMB 215 million Yuan’s loan from A 
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Company after it received the first 215 million as the proceeds received from selling 
the trust certificates. Otherwise, there was no loan between A Company and B 
Company. Under the Trust Contract, it is impossible to have such a relationship that 
a fund financed through trust could be re-issued as a loan. 
Moreover, article 5.2 of the Trust Contract mentioned that “the trustee shall, 
through disposing of the collateral according to the trust instrument, obtain funds to 
pay the senior beneficiaries’ principal and expected profits”; article 6.2 stipulated 
that “the settlor voluntarily mortgages the underlying real estate to the trustee as the 
mortgagee (and the parties shall execute a separate mortgage agreement) in order to 
ensure that the trustee will be able to exercise various rights in managing the trust 
property, including but not limited to the right to benefits and the right to disposing 
of the property, and to ensure that the settlor will fulfill the obligation to make up 
any fund deficiency.” In addition, after the dispute arose, the parties both 
acknowledged the validity and effectiveness of the Trust Contract. Based on the 
above reasons, the mortgage (if it did exist) based on the underlying real estate 
would be secondary to the Trust Contract, instead of any other loan contract.  
However, owing to the deficiency of the Chinese trust law system, the mortgage 
may be alleged as invalid for lack of registration of the Trust Contract. Therefore, it 
is understandable that A Company decided to sign a fake Loan Contract with B 
Company as the primary contract so that the mortgage agreement might be registered 
as secondary to it. By doing so, A Company may better protect its own interests in 
that in case the mortgage secondary to the Trust Contract is regarded as invalid, the 
mortgage secondary to the Loan Contract would be valid because it complies with all 
legal requirements. It is fair to say that the reasons why many trust companies in 
China have tried to establish multiple protections for their own benefits in financial 
transactions include the misunderstanding of the transfer of the ownership right over 
the trust property and the lacking of the trust registration system. Since it is 
impossible to register trust property based on the trust contracts, many trust 
companies decided to use fake loan contracts to obtain the mortgage right. This 
practice has become an open-secret in Chinese trust industry except that it has never 
been challenged through judicial proceedings. With increasing number of such trusts 
created and huge amount of funds involved, the disputes arise more and more 
frequently. It is time for Chinese court to clarify the trust relationship and resolve the 
problem. Although this practice is understandable, it obviously has an illegal 
purpose covered by a lawful form; therefore the Loan Contract should be declared 
invalid. Accordingly, after piercing the veil, the Trust Contract, as well as the 
mortgage secondary to it, should be declared valid. 
Fortunately, the Chinese court recognized the effectiveness of the Trust Contract, 
and determined that the alleged “loan principal” actually came from the trust 
property, and did not belong to A Company’s own assets, and thus A Company 
could not use this fund to grant to others as a loan.
52
 In addition, the court pointed 
out that A Company tried to make illegal gains for itself by charging a loan interest 
in the Loan Contract which was higher than the interest rate it promised to pay to the 
Trust beneficiaries. It actually wanted to make illegal gains for itself by using other 
                                                          
  52  See Trust Law, supra note 24, art. 27 (prohibiting the trustee from turning trust 
property into its own assets). 
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investors’ money in violation of the Trust Law which provides that the trustee may 
only receive remuneration according to the Trust Law and the Trust Contract.
53
  
However, the court did not directly invalidate the Loan Contract; instead, it held 
that the Loan Contract should be regarded valid as secondary to the Trust Contract 
for purpose of implementing the mortgage agreement, considering the situation that 
the real estate bureau would not register a mortgage agreement based on the Trust 
Contract.
54
 The court especially reasoned that both parties intended to execute the 
Loan Contract in order to secure the performance of the Trust Contract. The 
defendant’s argument that the Loan Contract should be held invalid was not 
supported by the court because the court worried that once the Loan Contract was 
held invalid, the mortgage agreement subordinated to the Loan Contract would also 
be invalid, thus the mortgagee’s right would be denied. By making such a decision, 
the court acknowledged and compromised over the current situation in China 
regarding trust registration, and meanwhile, to a great extent, protected the large 
scaled similar trusts existing in China. Nevertheless, the court ignored a couple 
issues as discussed in this paper. If the court recognized (1) that the title of the trust 
property had been transferred to A Company, and (2) that the underlying assets were 
also part of the trust property, the property would be owned by A Company and 
therefore there would be no need for A Company to hold it as collateral. The court’s 
worries would be unnecessary. 
III. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
Securitization as an innovation of financial world has been a hot topic in China in 
the recent decades. The initial motive for Chinese government to propose asset 
securitization was to resolve the bad debts of the state-owned banks.
55
 Later, various 
advantages of securitization have been identified. For example, people believe that 
asset securitization will help the enterprises to get finance at a lower cost and will 
help develop Chinese financial industry. In the recent years, with the deepening of 
the reform of real estate system, home loan mortgages have been greatly developed 
in China; consequently, banks have a need to securitize these mortgage-based assets. 
In addition, non-mortgage-backed securitization has also developed in China to meet 
the market demands. Among them, trust companies have been playing an 
increasingly important role. It is widely recognized that commercial trusts are the 
most important vehicles used in securitization transactions, therefore, most of the 
securitization or structured finance transactions have utilized commercial trusts. 
Trust industry has even been regarded as the representative of the shadow banking in 
China. 
However, owing to the facts that trust system is a transplanted system in China, 
and that the Chinese Trust Law has many inherent defects, the development of trusts 
has met quite a few obstacles. The most prominent ones are the transfer of title of the 
trust property and the public notice system of trusts. The case analyzed in this paper 
                                                          
 53  Id. at art. 26 & 35. 
 54  See Supra note 36,  at 32. 
 55  Dan Huang, Analysis on the Obstacles of Securitization in China, 4 FINANCES AND 
ECONOMY (2001). 
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well illustrates these problems. If these problems are not resolved, the development 
of securitization in China will be greatly restricted.  
The problems may be seen clearly from the case discussed in this paper. One of 
the parties of the case at issue was a real estate company that needed financing and 
the other party was a trust company that had or had access to funds, and therefore 
was at a stronger position. The irrational real estate market in the recent years made 
both parties believe that they could get huge profits out of the real estate 
development project, therefore they decided to work together to achieve their goal. 
However, the parties did not consummate a financing transaction through way of 
traditional lending because the real estate company did not meet the requirements 
imposed by the Chinese government; instead, they decided to use a more popular 
and advanced way of structured finance to raise funds from the public investors 
through establishing a commercial trust. Since Chinese government heavily regulates 
the cash trusts, they designed a non-cash trust using the “right to proceeds to be 
accrued from the underlying assets” as the trust property.  
After carefully examining the Trust Contract executed by the parties, it can be 
concluded that the trust property actually included both the underlying assets and the 
right to proceeds to be accrued therefrom. When analyzing it in accordance with the 
Chinese Trust Law, the Trust Contract between the two parties was lawful and valid, 
and the Trust was effectively created. However, because of both congenital and 
postnatal deficiencies of the trust system in China, what was the trust property and 
who would own the trust property were uncertain. Since there is neither a trust 
registration system in China to post public notice regarding the ownership right in 
the trust property, nor a system allowing registration of security agreement under the 
trust contracts, the trust company did not feel that its rights would be protected by 
the Trust Law. Therefore, it signed another loan contract with the real estate 
developer to redefine the structured finance as a secured loan, trying to convert the 
parties’ relationship from a trust relationship to a debtor-creditor relationship, and 
thus obtained the mortgagee’s right against the underlying real estate of the trust 
property. When the real estate market went down and the underlying project failed to 
make the expected profits and thus the trust company could not repay the senior 
beneficiaries, the trust company sued the real estate developer based on breach of the 
loan contract. 
However, the fatal problem of this allegation is that the only fund that the real 
estate developer had ever received from this financing transaction was the RMB 215 
million Yuan received from the sale of the trust certificates, and it had never 
received any other loans from the trust company. Therefore, the creation of the trust 
relationship between the two parties actually prevented the establishment of the loan 
relationship between the same parties. As a reasonable result, the mortgage 
agreement registered as secondary to the primary Loan Contract should also be 
invalid.  
The Chinese trial court had a hearing on March 7, 2013 to try this case and made 
a decision on June 7, 2013. The court held that the Trust Contract was valid, but did 
not invalidate the Loan Contract or the mortgage agreement on the ground that the 
execution of the Loan Contract was to ensure the proper performance of the Trust 
Contract, and therefore the Loan Contract should be regarded as a subordinated 
contract to the Trust Contract. To this end, the Court allowed the plaintiff (trust 
company) to foreclose the collateral based on the mortgage agreement secondary to 
the Loan Contract.  
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The case was appealed to the High People’s Court in Shanghai and was affirmed 
in December 2013.
56
 Since this case is the first ever in China to test the laws on 
trusts and securitization, and also because huge amount of money worth trust 
certificates have been issued by similar trusts in China, the decision of this case is 
very significant. Even before the court’s final decision is made, as a result of the 
recent trust breaches, many trust companies have already compressed their trust 
business.
57
 Unfortunately, the court’s decision is not satisfactory. 
There are at least three problems in the court’s decision. First, the court 
determined that the trust property in this case was the right to proceeds other than the 
underlying real estate, which was misplaced. As analyzed in this paper, the trust 
property of the Trust Contract at issue, as well as most of the other similar trust 
contracts executed by the trust companies and real estate developers in China, 
actually includes both the underlying real estate and the right to proceeds to be 
accrued from the underlying assets because these trust contracts all provide that the 
trust property includes the proceeds to be received from managing, utilizing, and 
selling the underlying real estate without deducting its original value. This question 
is very crucial because it will determine whether the mortgage agreement under the 
Loan Contract would be valid or not. Since the court believed that the trust property 
was only the right to proceeds based on the wording of the Trust Contract itself
58
, it 
ignored the substantial nature of the trust. As a result, it was reluctant to hold the 
Loan Contract invalid because doing so would render the mortgage agreement 
secondary to the Loan Contract invalid
59
, and thus, the court believed that the 
investors’ interests might not be able to be protected. Consequently, the court held 
that the Mortgage Agreement the parties executed under the Loan Contract was valid 
because they reflected both parties’ true intent and did not violate any prohibitive 
provisions of Chinese law or regulations so that the trust company would be able to 
foreclose the collateral to satisfy its creditor’s rights. 
A related problem is the recognition of the transfer of the trust property in 
securitization transactions. Although the current Trust Law does not mandatorily 
require the title to the trust property to be transferred, the court should take into 
consideration the international practice as well as the custom in the trust industry and 
hold that the trust property in this case and the other similar cases had actually been 
transferred to the trustee. This way, the interests of the investors will be better 
protected and the mortgage agreement will not be necessary because the trustee now 
has already got the title to the property and therefore could dispose of the property to 
satisfy the beneficiaries’ interests. The court would not have to make the ridiculous 
decision which upheld the Trust Contract but did not invalidate the Loan Trust and 
the subordinated mortgage agreement. 
The third problem is that the court totally ignored the real estate developer’s 
status as a servicer in the structured finance transaction, and upheld the obligation 
imposed by the trust company on the real estate company that the latter needed to 
                                                          
 56  Hu Gao Min 5 (Shang) Zhong Zi, CIV. JUDGMENT, 2013 (Shanghai High People’s Ct. 2013). 
 57  Anxin Trust Company Swallowed the Bitter Pill, 21
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 CENTURY ECONOMIC NEWS (March 8, 
2013), available at http://money.163.com/13/0308/04/8PDRRPO600253B0H.html. 
 58  See Supra note 36, at 32. 
 59  Id. at 36. 
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deposit minimum amount of funds to the Trust Account held by the trustee. If the 
court has resolved the above two issues, it would be easy to identify that the 
underlying real estate had already been transferred to and owned by the trust 
company, therefore the management and sale of the trust property would be the 
trustee’s job instead of the real estate developer’s obligation. Such a requirement 
would be held invalid. Even if the real estate developer would still be entrusted to 
keep and manage the underlying assets, it did so as a servicer only, and a servicer 
should not have the obligation to make sure the Trust Account have minimum 
amount of funds. The plaintiff alleged that by not keeping the minimum amount of 
funds in the Trust Accounts, the real estate developer had breached the Trust 
Contract and the Loan Contract. This argument was untenable but nevertheless 
supported by the Chinese court.
60
 
These problems have actually attacked the heart of the Chinese trust system. To 
resolve these problems, the Chinese legislature should revise the Trust Law and the 
relevant regulations to close certain loopholes in the law to clarify that (1) the trust 
property should be transferred in securitization transactions when the initiator will 
receive consideration; (2) the trust property in the so-called “right trusts” should 
include the underlying assets if all of the sales proceeds of the assets would be part 
of the trust property; and (3) after the commercial trusts are established, the 
obligation to manage the trust property should be upon the trustee instead of the 
settlor, although the settlor may be hired as a servicer. 
After the trust system has been introduced into China, it has been incompatible 
with the Chinese system like water and fire. Although the Trust Law has been 
promulgated for over 13 years, it has never been materially tested by Chinese 
judicial system. Therefore, the trial of this case is very significant and has been 
expected to help clarify some misunderstandings in the trust law area, promote the 
development of Chinese trust industry, and make the trust law system originated 
from the common law countries to be fully integrated into Chinese legal system. 
Obviously, the court decision failed people’s expectation.  
When this paper was still under revision, Chinese government approved and 
established Shanghai (China) Pilot Free Trade Zone. It has sent a message to the 
world that China is going to deepen its economic reform and one of its focuses is its 
financial system and the capital market. Among others, securitization is still one of 
the things that the government will promote. To this end, the revision of the laws and 
regulations on trusts and securitization is necessary. 
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